Besley and. Ghatak () develop a model of agent motivation in which the extent to which agents take care depends on the extent to which they agree with the. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. By TIMOTHY BESLEY. SCOTT ASHWORTH. Princeton University. Search for. Besley, Timothy () Principled agents?: the political economy of good government. The Lindahl lectures. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Author: Telabar Duzahn
Country: Spain
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Finance
Published (Last): 16 March 2006
Pages: 217
PDF File Size: 10.46 Mb
ePub File Size: 9.97 Mb
ISBN: 413-2-87873-343-4
Downloads: 64046
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Mikatilar

How do Principledd find a book? From 25 December to 1 Januarythe Library’s Reading Rooms will be closed and no collection requests will be filled. Search my Subject Specializations: But should these issues be studied against a background of purely self-interested public servants?

Principled agents?: the political economy of good government

Cite this Email this Add to favourites Print this page. Quite simply, a great book by a great economist. Understanding the workhouse test: Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago “How does the structure of democratic political institutions and organization shape policy choice?

What is good government? What is good government? Catalogue Persistent Identifier https: The key to good government is institution design- in the best Federalist tradition- to improve incentives in policymaking and selection to public office.

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Classical, Early, and Medieval Poetry and Poets: Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. Browse titles authors subjects uniform titles series callnumbers dewey numbers starting from optional. Print Save Cite Email Share. Bibliographic Information Print publication date: The author emphasises that it is not just about designing an appropriate institutional framework, but also about understanding the way incentives work and the process by which the political class is selected.


Mainstream policy economics now pays more attention to the delivery of policy outcomes and how incentives and institutional change shape the effectiveness of government.

Principled agents? : the political economy of good government / Timothy Besley – Details – Trove

Ebook This title is available as an ebook. Subscriber Login Email Address. Publications Pages Publications Pages. This path-breaking book boldly claims that well-designed institutions can help voters select politicians who are ‘better: The other sees government as driven by private interests, susceptible to those with the aegnts to influence its decisions, and failing to incentivise its officials to act for the greater public good.

Can I get a copy? Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use for details see www.

Reassembling the Social Bruno Latour. The other sees gov It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Thomson Professor of Government, Harvard University.

Principled Agents?

Details Collect From YY It should be read by all those who want to understand what it is that brings about good government. More What is good government? Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: This book adopts a middle way between the two extremes, the Publius approach, which recognizes the potential for government to act for the public good but also accepts the fact that things often go wrong.


Further information on the Library’s opening hours is available at: What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own?

Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government – Oxford Scholarship

Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago. Tim Besley has given us a broad and deep analysis of this fundamental agency problem which is essential to the theory of democracy.

Novel in its emphasis on information, this unprecedentedly careful, thorough analysis of the ‘agency’ problem links voters’ ability to screen out bad politicians and discipline rent-seeking pirncipled the competence, motivation, and alignment of politicians’ preferences to explain a wide variety of political economy and public finance outcomes including debt accumulation, the size and scope of government activities, corruption, and political turnover.

Why do some governments fail?